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Revisiting the Role of the Psychological
Parent in the Dissolution of the Homosexual
Relationship*
CAROLINE L. KINSEYt
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the United States and across the world,
homosexual couples have begun to raise children while
residing as a single-family unit. Whether choosing to
undergo in vitro fertilization,' gestational surrogacy,2
adoption' or donor insemination, as of the year 2000,
approximately "33% of female same-sex couple households
and 22% of male same-sex couple households" consist of at
least one child under the age of 18.4 Although "millions of
* This article was originally published as Caroline L. Kinsey, The Role of
the Psychological Parent in the Dissolution of the Homosexual Relationship, 10
INT'L J. DISCRIMINATION & L. 133 (2009).
t Caroline L. Kinsey is a New York State and federal licensed attorney.
1. See Ramon Johnson, Before Gay Men Choose Surrogacy Through In Vitro
Fertilization (iVF), ABoUT.com, http://gaylife.about.com/od/gayparentingadoptio
n/a/surrogacy.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (defining in vitro fertilization as
the "joining of a woman's egg and a mans [sic] sperm...").
2. See SURROGACY INFO MEDICAL TERMINOLOGY, http://www.surrogacyinfo.co
m/medicalterms. html (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) ("A gestational surrogate
mother carries a baby that is genetically unrelated to her for another couple or
person. The surrogate mother undergoes in-vitro fertilization to achieve
pregnancy. In some states, the court recognizes gestational surrogacy and has
clearly stated laws to define a gestational surrogate mother.")
3. Adam P. Romero et al., THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, CENSUS SNAPSHOT: THE
UNITED STATES, 1-2 (2007), http://www.2.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publicat
ions/USCensusSnapshot.pdf (noting that as of December 2007 approximately
65,500 of the adopted children in the United States reside with gay or lesbian
parents).
4. Ruth Ullman Paige, Proceedings of the American Psychological
Association, Incorporated, for the Legislative Year 2004, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
436, 499 (2005).
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lesbians and gay men have biological or adoptive children"5
and approximately 270,313 children in the United States
reside in households headed by same-sex couples,' courts
remain hesitant to provide blanket protection to those
families should dissolution of the homosexual relationship
occur.
If a child's parents do choose to separate, legal issues
arise with respect to whether the non-legal co-parent may
be considered the child's legal parent under the term "other
recognized grounds."' Although non-legal homosexual
parents retain the right to participate in a "second- parent"
adoption process in several states, this right is not uniform
across the nation,' and as a consequence for failing to adopt
their non-biological child, or not being legally permitted to
5. Kate Kendell, Lesbian and Gay Parents in Child Custody and Visitation
Disputes, HUM. RTs. MAG. (Summer 2003), http://www.americanbar.org/publicati
ons/humanrights-magazine_home/ irr-hrsummer03_custody.html.
6. Romero, et al., supra note 3 at 2. See also Paige, supra note 4, at 499;
James Nash, Kids Caught in Gay Splits-Inseminated Mother Disputes Ex-
Partner's Shared Custody, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 24, 2010,
http://www.dispatch.com/live/contentAocalnews/stories/2010/05/24/kids-caught-
in-gay-splits.html?sid=101 (stating in Ohio as of 2005, approximately 11,950
children reside in households headed by same-sex couples). Note this number
has increased from 1999, of which the Gay and Lesbian Atlas reported
approximately 250,000 children were being raised by same-sex couples. GARY
GATES & JASON OST, THE GAY AND LESBIAN ATLAS (2004).
7. W.VA. CODE § 48-1-232 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004); see also Clifford K. v.
Paul S., 619 S.E.2d 138 (W. Va. 2005).
8. Joanna Bunker Rohrbaugh, Lesbian/Gay Family Dissolution, 5 MAGAL
NEWS: NEWSLETTER OF THE MASS. Assoc. OF GUARDIANS AD LITEM 6 (Nov. 2000).
As of 2010, approximately 17 states have established laws that explicitly allow
same-sex couples to adopt, either through a second parent adoption or through
stepparent adoption procedures. Second parent adoptions have also been
awarded by trial courts in approximately twelve states. For a comprehensive list
of these states, see Adoption by LGBT Parents, NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS,
2010, http://www.nclrights.org/site/docserver/2pa-state_1ist.pdf?docid=3201.
Once a non-legal parent has adopted the child as a second parent, the original
legal parent may no longer challenge the legal standing of that parent. See also,
In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 539 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1995).
9. Gay Couple In Bitter Custody Battle, CLICK ON DETROIT, Mar. 22, 2010,
http://www.clickondetroit.com/news/22912140/detail.html (stating homosexual
co-parents may not seek second parent adoption in Michigan).
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do so,'o gay and lesbian parents often find themselves
without protection from the judicial system and may be
prevented from asserting custody or visitation rights of the
child in question." While courts justify this custodial
decision on the ground that it serves the best interests of
the child and promotes stability and continuity within the
family unit,' further inquiry demonstrates judicial
hypocrisy in defining what is truly in the best interests of
the child. In failing to recognize non-biological or non-
adoptive parents as legal parents and destroying all ties
between a child and the non-legal parent, courts use the
best interests of the child standard merely as a guise for
moral, religious and political agendas that further the best
interests of society instead of the best interests of the child
in question.
This essay evaluates child custody decisions made by
state courts pertaining to the dissolution of homosexual
partnerships. First, I elaborate upon the standards courts
employ in arriving at custodial decisions. Second, I define
the psychological parent doctrine and explore its wide
application to homosexual parents. Third, I evaluate
various state courts' interpretations of the doctrine with
respect to homosexual couples, highlighting courts that
have awarded custody and visitation rights to non-legal
parents on the basis of psychological parentage and
identifying courts that ruled to the contrary. I conclude by
urging courts extend application of the psychological parent
doctrine to homosexual co-parents under the term "other
recognized grounds," and apply the four prong test outlined
10. See generally Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Child Custody and
Visitation Rights Arising from Same-sex Relationship, 80 A.L.R. 5th 1, §2[a]
(2000). See also, In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Neb. 2002); In re
Adoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); In re Angel Lace
M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Wis. 1994).
11. See generally Miller, supra note 10.
12. Cox v. Cox, 2000 ND 144, 613 N.W.2d 516, 521-22 ("When a psychological
parent and a natural parent each seek a court-ordered award of custody, the
natural parent's paramount right to custody must prevail unless the court
determines it is necessary in the best interests of the child to award custody to
the psychological parent to prevent serious detriment to the welfare of the
child." (citing Goter v. Goter, 1997 ND 28, 559 N.W.2d 834)). See also V.C. v.
M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 539 (N.J. 2000); Dehar v. Dehar, 521 N.Y.S.2d 335, 336
(App. Div. 1987).
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in Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody of H.S.H.-K),13 to
determine who may be considered a psychological parent in
the eyes of the law. This argument relies largely in part on
the core belief that state courts and legislatures must
extend the legal rights and protections afforded to all
heterosexual citizens to homosexual couples in a way
uniform with our country's principles of equality, privacy
and liberty, while respecting the interest of each individual
state in supporting its children and maintaining stability of
the ever-dynamic family unit.14
I. THE "LEGAL PARENT" AND "OTHER RECOGNIZED GROUNDS"
A non-legal parent must have standinF before he is able
to assert rights within child custody cases. During disputes
between homosexual co-parents, the initial inquiry is
whether former partners in non-marital relationships are
awarded child custody rights under the state's statutory
scheme.16 Once it has been determined whether a statutory
scheme is applicable to the debate at hand, state courts may
next look to whether the couple entered into a civil union or
marriage legally recognizable by either the state where the
pending custody matter is ensuing or the state where the
union occurred. If the couple entered into a union outside
the state where the custody agreement is being litigated,
the custodial court has the right to either recognize that
union and award automatic joint custody to the non-legal
parent," or hold the union invalid and apply the laws of the
13. Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.), 533 N.W.2d 419, 421
(Wis. 1995) (establishing a four prong test which includes (1) the legal parent's
fostering of the non-legal parent's relationship with the child; (2) the fact that
the non-legal parent co-habited with the child; (3) the obligations assumed by
the non-legal parent to care for the child; and (4) the formation of a bonded
parent-child relationship between the non-legal parent and the child).
14. See generally An Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil
Unions and Domestic Partnerships 2005 A.B.A. SEC. FAM. L. 8, 9, http://www.am
ericanbar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/family/reports/WhitePaper.authcheckd
am.pdf.
15. L.M.S. v. C.M.G., No. CN04-08601 2006 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 298, at *40-
44 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jun. 26, 2006); Chambers v. Chambers, No. CN99-09493, 2002
WL 1940145 (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 5, 2002).
16. Miller, supra note 10, § 2 [b].
17. Jeremy Peters, New York Court Expands Rights of Non-birth Parents in
Same-Sex Relationship, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010, at A26 (referring to In re
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state of the custodial court.'" Further, if the parties entered
into a written agreement that pertained to child custody
prior to the dissolution of their relationship, the custodial
court may either recognize or disregard that document at its
discretion.19
Because the majority of state legislation is silent on
whether custody may be awarded to homosexual couples
after the dissolution of their relationship,20 courts next look
to whether the party is deemed a "legal parent" in the eyes
of the law.2 1 If the party is considered a legal parent, he or
she will be permitted to assert standing within the child
custody proceeding.22 A party not found to be a legal parent
by statute must turn to one or more equitable doctrines to
assert rights within the custody dispute.23 While courts
have failed to generate a uniform decision on the definition
H.M. v. E.T., 881 N.Y.S.2d 113 (App. Div. 2009)). In 2010, the New York State
Court of Appeals expanded the rights of homosexual co-parents by unanimously
permitting a non-legal parent to seek visitation and custody rights of a child she
co-parented with her former partner, due to the fact that the two had entered
into a civil union in the state of Vermont that was legally recognizable by the
State of New York. Note also that Florida will recognize any out of state
judgment establishing legal parentage if custody is re-disputed in the state of
Florida. See Cathy Sakimura, Child Custody and Visitation Issues for Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Parents in Florida, NAT'L CENTER FOR LESBIAN
RTs. 2009 at 7, www.nclrights.org/site/docserver/2007_10_02_FLCustodyPub.pd
f?docid=2101.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2011).
19. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 959 (R.I. 2000) (enforcing a written
agreement between the parties that awarded former same-sex partner visitation
rights with the child the parties co-parented).
20. Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 2-3 (Del. 2009); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736
So.2d 106, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). See also Smith v. Jones, 868 N.E.2d
629 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (providing an example of a case which is silent on the
issue).
21. See Miller, supra note 10, at § 2 [a].
22. In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 311-13 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)
(holding that the transsexual husband of an artificially inseminated woman did
not have standing to assert custody rights because he was not a legal parent of
the child, since Illinois does not recognize same-sex marriages); In re Marriage
of Wilson, 110 P.3d 1106, 1108 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (awarding the term 'legal
parent' to natural and adoptive parents). Clifford K. v. Paul S., 619 S.E.2d 138,
147 (W. Va. 2005).
23. Miller, supra note 10, at § 2.
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of "legal parent," most maintain a party must demonstrate
one of three elements to receive legal status: (1) the party
has a biological or presumed biological relationship with the
child in question; (2) the party has formally adopted the
child through judicially recognized proceedings; or (3) the
party has been labeled the child's parent on the basis of de
facto parentage or other recognized grounds.24
Courts are split on whether former same sex partners
are able to achieve standing in custody disputes under the
term, "other recognized grounds." Traditionally, the non-
legal co-parent has failed to be awarded legal parent status
under this standard." Recently, however, courts have begun
to apply the psychological parent doctrine to the
relationship between the non-legal parent and the child.26
In acknowledging this relationship, these courts maintain
when the partner establishes he or she was the
"psychological parent of the child . . . [or the] . . .
relationship with the child was parent-like, the partner [is]
entitled to consideration of [the] claim... and is not to be
treated as a.. .third party."27 Moreover, jurisdictions such as
Colorado, Indiana, Minnesota, Texas and the District of
Columbia deviate from the traditional requirements for a
non-legal parent to obtain standing in a determination of
child custody, and instead abide by established criteria
under which those other than biological parents achieve
standing when initiating parental rights.28
24. Smith v. Guest, No. 252, 2011 WL 899550, at *1 (Del. Mar. 14, 2011);
Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010); C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 2004 ME
43, 845 A.2d 1146; Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.E.2d 51 (N.Y. 1991)
(recognizing only a child's biological or adoptive parent has standing to seek
visitation against the wishes of a custodial parent); Clifford K, 619 S.E.2d at
148 (referencing elements laid out in a West Virginia statute); Holtzman v.
Knott (In re custody of H.S.H.-K), 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995).
25. Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d at 151 (finding that lesbian partner was not "legal
parent" of deceased partner's child such that she had standing as a "legal
parent" to seek custody of the party's child).
26. Gestl v. Frederick, 754 A.2d 1087, 1101-1102 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
27. Miller, supra note 10, at § 2 [a].
28. Peters, supra note 17, at A26 (referring to Debra H. v. Janice R., 930
N.E.2d 184, 193 (N.Y. 2010)).
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II. THE ROLE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENT IN DEFINING
HOMOSEXUAL PARENTING
"The law does not recognize any absolute right in any
person... to the custody of a child."29  In order to best
ascertain why non-legal same-sex partners should be
allowed to initiate a child custody proceeding and receive
custodial rights, it is necessary to first understand the
nature and scope of the psychological parent doctrine.
A. Background
The concept of the psychological parent initially arose in
the 1970's during custody disputes between husband and
wife, natural parents and foster parents, or unfit parents
and grandparents.30 During one such custody dispute, a
court mentioned, in dicta, that in "certain instances,
psychological testimony may be relevant in aiding the
determination of who should [be awarded] custody of a
child."3' Although biological ties were the most important
factor in determining an award of custody, courts began to
state an individual may "be able to establish deprivation of
a legally recognized right to maintain some type of
continuing relationship with the child"32 even though they
bear no biological relationship to one another.
Also known as a "de facto" parent, or an individual
receiving custody in loco parentis, the psychological parent
is presently defined as one who "on a continuing and
29. State ex rel. Lipscomb v. Joplin, 47 S.E.2d 221, 225 (W. Va. 1948).
30. Howard v. Gish, 373 A.2d 1280 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Williams v.
Miller, 385 A.2d 992 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); Gary A. Debele, Custody and
Parenting by Persons Other Than Biological Parents: When Non-Traditional
Family Law Collides With the Constitution, 83 N.D. L. REV. 1227, 1242 (2007);
Philip F. Schuster, Constitutional and Family Law Implications of the Sleeper
and Troxel Cases: A Denouement for Oregon's Psychological Parent Statute?, 36
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 549, 573-77 (2000).
31. State ex rel. McCartney v. Nuzum, 248 S.E.2d 318, 320 n.3 (W. Va. 1978),
overruled on other grounds by In re Katie S., 479 S.E.2d 589 (W. Va. 1996).
32. A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 665 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
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regular basis, provides for a child's emotional and physical
needs." 3
Today, a party seeking to establish status as a
psychological parent must meet three general requirements:
(1) they must not be the child's legal parent; (2) they must
have, with the consent of the child's legal parent, resided
with the child within a significant period of time and; (3)
they must have routinely performed at least an equal share
of the caretaking functions with the child's primary
caregiver without any expectation of compensation for the
care. These general factors are not exhaustive, and courts
exercise discretion in adding additional factors to be
considered in determining psychological parent status.
Added factors courts have considered include whether: the
non-legal parent attempted to maintain a relationship with
the child post-separation;5 the legal parent and the child
developed a "close and loving relationship;""3 a "parent-child
bond [has been] forged"; the parties held themselves out to
the world at large as a single family unit, the amount of
financial support the non-legal parent contributed to the
support of the legal parent and child was significant;3 1 the
legal-parent and partner had a committed relationship prior
to the conception or adoption of the child;39 the child's
surname reflected the non-legal partner's name;40 the
parties planned the pregnancy or adoption together.4 While
the importance level of each of these factors varies from
state to state, courts across the nation are unanimous in
maintaining the most significant indicia of a forged
33. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1145 (8th ed. 2004) ("[tlhe psychological parent
may be the biological parent, a foster parent, a guardian, a common-law parent,
or some other person unrelated to the child").
34. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551 (N.J. 2000).
35. In re Hirenia C., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443, 452 (Ct. App. 1993).
36. Honaker v. Burnside, 388 S.E.2d 322, 323 (W. Va. 1989).
37. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 893 (Mass. 1999); V.C., 748 A.2d at
543; A.F. v. D.L.P., 771 A.2d 692, 699 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
38. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 889, 892.
39. Id. at 830.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 889-89.
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psychological parent-child relationship is the child's
recognition of the non-legal party as that child's "parent."42
B. Application to Homosexual Co-Parents
Once custody had been established between children
and non-legal family members,43 questions began to arise as
to whether the concept of the psychological parent could
extend to the dissolved homosexual relationship." Initially
courts responded in the negative, noting the psychological
parent must be inter reted narrowly when deciding
custodial arrangements. This conservative approach was
not followed by all jurisdictions, and slowly courts
recognized the same psychological bond forged between a
child and non-legal parent or family member could be forged
between a child and his or her homosexual co-parents.46
Courts also began to acknowledge a party's ability to parent
his or child bore no relation to his or her sexuality. This
trend of a more liberal approach towards homosexual co-
parents has slowly transformed into today's "child-centered,
evidence based approach" to the psychological parent
doctrine, which ignores the sexual preference of the parent
in question and instead favors an "individualized
assessment of the child's best interests" in relation to the
non-legal parent in question.48 Although judicial responses
towards homosexual co-parents seeking child custody or
42. In re Hirenia C., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443, 449 (Ct. App. 1993); E.N.O., 711
N.E.2d at 892-93; Lynda A.H. v. Diane T.O., 673 N.Y.S.2d 989, 990 (App. Div.
1998).
43. See A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 665 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that
an individual may "be able to establish deprivation of a legally recognized right
to maintain some type of continuing relationship with the child" even though
they share no legal ties).
44. See generally In re Hirenia C., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443 (Ct. App. 1993); Gestl
v. Frederick, 754 A.2d 1087 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711
N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999); A.C., 829 P.2d at 664-65.
45. See Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So.2d 106, 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999);
Liston v. Pyles, No. 97APF01-137, 1997 WL 467327, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug.
12, 1997).
46. See Kendell, supra note 5.
47. Nadler v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352, 354 (Ct. App. 1967)
(determining a parent could not be labeled unfit based on her or her sexuality).
48. Kendell, supra note 5.
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visitation rights under the psychological parent doctrine
"have improved dramatically" since the 1980s and 1990s,49
jurisdictions today remain split on whether psychological
parentage should be granted to former same-sex partners of
co-parented children.
Those in favor of extending the psychological parent
doctrine to homosexual co-parents recognize the unusual
and extraordinary circumstances that surround the
homosexual child-rearing process and understand a bond
can be forged between a homosexual parent and a child
regardless of whether those parties share genetic or legal
ties." Further, proponents acknowledge "interaction,
companionship, interplay, . . . mutuality" and fulfillment of
a "child's emotional and financial [needs]" should be at the
forefront of a custodial court's legal determination, and
outweigh any social, moral, or political considerations.52
Additionally, it may be argued homosexual couples should
not be "forced" to adopt their children, and treating
homosexual families different inadvertently punishes the
very children the judicial system seeks to protect.
Those opposing the extension of the psychological
parent doctrine to same-sex couples may present four main
arguments. First, it may be urged extension of the
psychological parent doctrine to homosexual couples
presents a slippery slope53 because it implies parental rights
can be received merely through the establishment of an
emotional relationship between a non-parent and a child.54
49. Id.
50. See V.C. v. M.J.B., 758 A.2d 539, 550-51 (N.J. 2000). See also T.B. v.
L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873, 889-91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (granting psychological
parentage or discussing concepts surrounding the psychological parentage).
51. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST
DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 9 (1996) ("Unlike adults, children have no
psychological conception of blood-tie relationships until quite late in their
development . . . [wihat matters to them is the pattern of day-to-day
interchanges with the adults who take care of them and who, on the strength of
such interactions, become parent figures to whom they are attached."); see also
V.C., 758 A.2d at 550-51.
52. Clifford K v. Paul S., 619 S.E.2d 138, 157 (W. Va. 2005).
53. See Emmalee M. Miller, Are you my Mother? Missouri Denies Custodial
Rights to Same-Sex Parent, 75 MISSOURI L. REV. 1377, 1407 (2010).
54. See Colorado Court Vacates (For Now) Trial Court Order That Prohibits
A Mother From Exposing Her Child To "Homophobic" Religious Upbringing Or
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ROLE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENT
Under this notion, custodial rights may be granted to
distant relatives, neighbors, family friends or babysitters.
Second, it may be argued placing a child in a single family.
home with a non-biological relative when a biological or.
legally related relative is available is "anti-family." Third,
it may be believed the doctrine of the psychological parent
infringes upon the "constitutional right [of legal parents] to
direct the upbringing of their children."" Last, it may be
proposed that it is solely within the province of the
legislature, and not that of the judiciary, to extend custodial
rights to homosexual co-parents." In accordance with this
belief, because it is the legislature and not the judiciary's
responsibility to create protection for homosexual parents,
the court cannot carve out exceptions for same-sex couples
absent legislative direction.
Although a court may extend the doctrine of the
psychological parent to encompass homosexual parents, the
majority of jurisdictions consider the doctrine itself and the
individual receiving parentage under it subordinate to the
legal parent." As such, even if the non-legal parent is able
to establish status as the child's psychological parent, he or
she may still be denied all custody rights. This narrow
interpretation of the psychological parent is not uniform
across the nation, and states such as New Jersey hold that
once a party is deemed a child's psychological parent, he or
she must be considered as one in parity with the child's
legal parent." Once both parents are deemed equal in the
eyes of the law, the court will then settle questions of
Training, LIBERTY COUNSEL (Jul. 1, 2004), http://www.1c.org/pressrelease/2004/n
r070104.htm.
55. See Clifford K, 619 S.E.2d at 161 (Maynard, J., dissenting).
56. See Lindsy J. Rohlf, Note, The Psychological-Parent and De Facto-Parent
Doctrines: How Should the Uniform Parentage Act Define "Parent"?, 94 IOWA L.
REv. 691, 710 (2009) (advocating for the rejection of the Psychological Parent
doctrine as applied to non-legal parents).
57. See id. at 701.
58. See Dehar v. Dehar, 521 N.Y.S.2d 335, 336 (App. Div. 1987) (finding that
psychological parenthood alone is not sufficient to constitute an "extraordinary
circumstance" warranting a grant of custody to biological mother's former same-
sex partner); Cox v. Cox, 2000 ND 44, 613 N.W.2d 516, 521.
59. See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 554 (N.J. 2000).
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custody on the basis of the best interest of the child
standard.60
III. COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENT
The approach courts rely on to determine custodial
disputes between legal and non-legal homosexual parents is
reasonably untested and varied across the nation. Because
of this lack of uniformity amongst the judicial system, state
courts differ in their interpretation of the psychological
parent doctrine as applied to homosexual couples. This
section analyzes various decisions reached by state courts
after application of the psychological parent doctrine, and
recognizes while some states abide by the psychological
parent doctrine in granting homosexual co-parents custodial
rights, other jurisdictions maintain the traditional notion
that biological ties are the ultimate determinative
factor when determining the custody of a child.
A. Courts Awarding Visitation or Custody to the
Psychological Parent
In the following cases, the court granted the non-legal,
homosexual co-parent standing under the "exceptional
circumstances" doctrine to seek joint legal custody of the
party's children on the basis that he or she was determined
to be the child's psychological parent. In rendering their
decisions these courts excluded sexuality as a factor and
looked primarily to the relationship the non-legal parent
maintained with the child. Each court also took into
consideration independent factors, such as the potential
emotional harm to the child, the burden to the non-legal
parent, whether a separate written agreement was made
between the parties pertaining to child custody/visitation
matters, and the intention of both parents at the time the
child was conceived or adopted, before determining the best
interest of the child was satisfied through continued
relationship with both parents.
One of the first cases to apply the psychological parent
doctrine to homosexual parents was In re Pearlman.6 1 In its
unpublished 1989 decision, Judge Robert C. Scott granted
60. See id.
61. See In re Pearlman, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1355 (1989) (Fla. Cir. Ct.).
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custody to the former same-sex partner of the child's
deceased mother over that of the child's legal maternal
grandparents.62 In arriving at its decision, the court deemed
the non-legal mother a "psychological parent" and found
that as the child's psychological parent, her liberty interest
would be violated if the child were to be adopted without
her consent." The court also recognized and took into
consideration the detrimental affect separation from the
non-legal parent would have on the child's physical and
emotional wellbeing.'
The child's emotional wellbeing was at the forefront of a
2004 decision by the Colorado Court of Appeals, which
granted visitation to a non-legal parent on the basis of
psychological parentage."5 In In re E.L.M.C.," a former
domestic partner petitioned the Colorado District Court for
equal parenting time with the child's adoptive mother. In
granting the former partner title as the child's psychological
parent, the court recognized the existence of a compelling
state interest in preventing emotional harm to the child,
which, it held, outwei hed any potential detriment the legal
parent would ensue.' In reaching its decision, the court
relied upon a four-prong test set forth in In re Custody of
H.S.H.-K6 for determining whether a psychological parent
relationship could exist between a child and her non-legal
homosexual parent.69 This test required: (1) that the legal
parent consented to and fostered the parental relationship
between the non-legal parent and the child; (2) that the
non-legal parent and child co-habited as a single family
unit; (3) that the non-biological parent assumed parental
obligations by taking on significant responsibility for the
care, education, and development of the child; and (4) that a
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546 (Colo. App. 2004).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 556.
68. Holtzman v. Knott (In re custody of H.S.H.-K), 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis.
1995).
69. Id. at 560.
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bonded, dependent relationship existed between the non-
legal parent and the child."
The four-pronged test established in In re Custody of
H.S.H.-K has also set the standard in the state of Maryland
for determining whether an individual may receive
custodial rights as a de-facto/psychological parent. In S.F.
v. M.D.," a case of first impression in the state of Maryland,
the state's highest court determined a non-legal parent who
agreed with her former partner to have a child, cared for the
child as if she biologically bore ties to the child, resided with
the child, and forged a parent-child like bond with the child
satisfied the four-pronged test. Because all four elements
set forth in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, were established, she
would automatically receive standing to assert a right to
obtain visitation with the child, and would not be required
to show parental unfitness of the legal mother or
exceptional circumstances warranting an order of joint
custody."
In Antonucci v. Cameron," the court discussed whether
visitation should be awarded to a non-legal homosexual
parent who assisted in raising the child her former partner
adopted during their relationship. Although Texas law only
permitted one of the women to legally adopt the child, the
non-legal parent resided with the child for approximately
three and one half years, assisted in the adoption process as
much as legally possible, and was consulted by the legal
parent in all child-rearing decisions.74 In awarding the non-
legal parent regular visitation with the child, the court
determined that it would be in the child's best interest to
continue furthering the ties between that child and the non-
70. Id. at 421.
71. See S.F. v. M.D., 751 A.2d 9, 15, 17 (Md. 2000), overruled by Janice M. v.
Margaret K, 948 A.2d 73, 87 (Md. 2008).
72. See S.F., 751 A.2d at 19. Although the court determined the non-legal
parent would have standing to seek visitation of the child, visitation was denied
on the basis that visitation between the child and the non-legal parent resulted
in significant behavioral problems for the child, and when visitation was
terminated in its entirety, the child's behavioral problems ceased. Id. at 19.
73. Antonucci v. Cameron, No. FA 980420247, 1999 WL 793974, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1999).
74. See id.
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legal parent regardless of the fact that she bore no legal ties
to the child."
In awarding a non-legal parent, Carol Chambers,
visitation, and forcing her to pay mandatory child support
to her former lesbian partner, Karen, the Delaware Family
Court in 2002 determined the non-legal parent should be
considered a "parent" due to the fact that her actions led to
the child's conception." In arriving at its decision, the
Court examined the circumstances predating conception
and implied psychological parentage was forged in the
events before conception due to the fact that when the
couple decided to have a child together through artificial
insemination, Carol funded a portion of the fertilization
process and signed the embryo transfer form." The Court
further noted although Carol did not contribute biologically
to the child's birth, her actions, coupled with the parties'
shared intent to conceive a child together, "constituted a
symbolic act of procreation"78 justifying at its minimum,
visitation rights and an obligation of child support to the
child they theoretically conceived together. The court
reasoned, "[h]ad Karen and Carol not acted in tandem,
David never would have been conceived."79
The Supreme Court of New Jersey also granted
visitation rights to the former same-sex domestic artner of
the children's biological mother in V.C. v. M.J.B. under a
similar framework. In identifying the non-legal partner as
the child's psychological parent, the court stated,
A psychological parent-child relationship that is
voluntarily created by the legally recognized parent may not
be unilaterally terminated after the relationship between
the adults end.. .the ending of the relationship between the
legal parent and the third party does not end the bond that
75. See id. at *3-4.
76. Chambers v. Chambers, No. CNOO-09493, 2002 WL 1940145, at *10 (Del.
Fam. Ct. Feb. 5, 2002).
77. See id. at *1, *10.
78. Id. at *10.
79. Id.
80. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 555 (N.J. 2000).
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the legal parent fostered and that actual y developed
between the child and the psychological parent.
The court recognized a requirement of unfitness should
not be a condition precedent to awarding custody to the non-
legal parent, and noted under the "exceptional
circumstances" doctrine, the legal parent qualified as a
statutory parent even though the legal parent was fit and
involved in her children's lives.82 Moreover, the court
distinguished the difference between the role of a non-legal
homosexual parent and the role of a nanny or a babysitter,
highlighting that a key factor to the creation of a
psychological relationship is the legal parent's fostering of
the non-legal parent's relationship with the child." The
emphasis of this requirement puts to rest critics arguments
that including non-legal parents as potential contenders for
child custody will create a slippery slope. Under this
framework, only individuals who have agreed with the
biological parent to stand as a second parent will be able to
claim the title of psychological parent. As such, the doctrine
of the psychological parent will no longer be made
applicable to part-time visitors, nannies or babysitters. The
New Jersey Supreme Court also expanded upon the rights
given to the psychological parent, stating denying a child's
psychological parent visitation rights is "such an
extraordinary proscription that it should be invoked only in
those exceptional cases where it clearly and convincingly
appears that the granting of visitation will cause physical or
emotional harm to the children"84
In E.N.O. v. L.M.M.," the Massachusetts Supreme
Court upheld the trial court's order granting a child's non-
legal parent visitation rights on the ground that she was
considered the child's "de facto" parent. In rendering its
opinion, the court considered the thirteen-year relationship
between the parties, the fact that both parties planned the
pregnancy, the role the non-legal parent played in the
child's life, and the connection between the non-legal parent
and the child, acknowledging the child referred to his non-
81. Id. at 552.
82. See id. at 549, 553-54.
83. See id. at 552.
84. Id. at 554-55 (citation omitted).
85. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 886 (Mass. 1999).
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legal parent as "Mommy" and told his classmates that he
had "two mothers."" The court also established a balancing
test, stating it must balance the legal mother's interest in
maintaining sole custody of her child against the child's
interest in continuing his relationship with his non-legal
parent." When compared to the loss the child would suffer,
the court stated the intrusion on the legal parent's interest
was "minimal."8
In the Matter of T.L., the court recognized the judiciary
must evolve with the "social fragmentation and myriad
configurations of the modern family."89 In granting the
former same sex partner of the child's legal parent
reasonable visitation of their two-year old child, the court
acknowledged "custody and visitation disputes no longer
occur solely between heterosexual couples," and must be
resolved in a way that considers the best interest of the
child, regardless of whether that meets traditional family
standards." The term "family," the court explained, means
a "continuing relationship of love and care, and an
assumption of responsibility for some other person"9'
regardless of the sexuality of the parties. Further, the court
emphasized it could not deprive a child of his non-legal
parent strictly because that parent pursued a lifestyle that
was "at odds with the norm." 2 Balancing the legal-parent's
right to control the child with the state's parens patriae
interest in the child's welfare, the court awarded the non-
birth mother extensive visitation and the right to
participate in all major life decisions affecting the child on
the basis that the "needs of the minor child for a continuing
relationship with each parent" significantly outweighed any
burden that may occur to the legal-parent."
86. Id. at 889.
87. See id. at 893-94.
88. Id.
89. In re T.L., No. 953-2340, 1996 WL 393521, at *2 (Mo. Cir. May 7, 1996).
90. Id.
91. Id. (citation omitted).
92. Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 5-6.
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The Delaware Family Court in In re Hart94 applied this
notion to two homosexual fathers in determining whether
the non-legal father had standing to adopt the couple's two
sons. In holding it was in the best interest of the children to
permit both parents to retain legal standing, the court
argued any other decision would be "absurd, unreasonable,
and unnecessary"" regardless of the sex of the parents or
the rights awarded to same-sex couples within the state of
Delaware.
In 2005, the Washington Supreme Court awarded a
homosexual co-parent standing to petition for status as a de
facto parent." Despite denying her petition for visitation,
the Court recognized its authority to adapt common law to
fill gaps in existing Washington statutes and emphasize the
best-interests-of-the-child-standard when evaluating
visitation petitions" by essentially concluding de-facto
parents are equal to legal-parents, and both the de-facto
and biological parent have a "'fundamental liberty interest[]'
in the 'care, custody, and control' of [the child in question]."
In a 54-page opinion and six to one ruling, the Supreme
Court of Montana, on October 6, 2009, awarded joint
custody of two children to the non-biological partner of the
children's birth mother.99 After their ten-year lesbian
relationship concluded in 2006, Maniaci, the children's birth
mother, married a man and cut off all ties between her
former partner, Kulstad, and their children.' In labeling
Kulstad the children's "psychological parent," the court
identified her as a "loving and stable force in the children's
lives"o' which justified the award of joint custody on the
94. In re Hart, 806 A.2d 1179 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001).
95. Id. at 1182.
96. Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage of L.B.), 122 P.3d 161, 175-177 (Wash.
2005).
97. Id. at 172-73.
98. Id. at 178 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)).
99. Kulstad v. Maniaci, 2009 MT 326, 220 P.3d 595.
100. Killian Melloy, ACLU, Gay Couples Sue Montana for Discrimination,
BOSTON EDGE (Jul. 23, 2010), http://www.edgeboston.com/index.php?ch=news&s
c2=news&sc3=&id=108380; Protecting Parenthood, DAILY INTERLAKE (Apr. 19,
2009, 1:00 am), http://www.dailyinterlake.com/opinion/columns/article_5036cffb-
8a84-57bf-8414-0ebb33969fbf .html.
101. Kulstad, 220 P.3d 595 at 600-01.
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basis that removal of this stable force would go against the
best-interests-of-the-child standard recognized in
Montana.02  In his concurring opinion, Judge Nelson
elaborated, "[niaming it for the evil it is, discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation is an expression of bigotry.
Lesbian and gay Montanans must not be forced to fight to
marry, to raise their children, and to live with the same
dignity that is accorded heterosexuals."103
B. Courts Failing to Award Visitation or Custody to
Psychological Parent
In the cases below, the court applied the de facto parent
or psychological parent doctrine and determined while a
psychological bond had been formed between the child and
his non-legal parent, an award of child visitation rights to
the partner was not supportable. In granting their
decisions, these courts took into consideration the statutory
scheme of the state and the fitness of the legal-parent to
continue parenting. These courts also found consensual
child rearing between homosexual couples was not an
extraordinary circumstance that warranted additional
protection of the relationship between the non-legal parent
and the child, or also held a private contractual agreement
between homosexual partners to rear a child would not
withstand judicial scrutiny and could not be upheld under
the laws of that particular state.'"
New York was one of the first states to severely restrict
the rights of homosexual psychological parents. In Dehar v.
Dehar, o' the Appellate Division reversed the lower court's
determination that the child's non-legal parent should be
granted custodial rights on the basis that he was the child's
psychological parent.'06 In reaching its decision, the court
102. Id. at 601.
103. Id. at 611 (Nelson, J., concurring).
104. Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So.2d 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (finding a
private agreement between a lesbian couple providing for visitation by the non-
biological mother unenforceable on the basis that parental rights, unlike
constitutional rights, cannot be waived or interfered with in this way-referring
to the rights of the biological parent).
105. Dehar v. Dehar, 521 N.Y.S.2d 335, 336 (App. Div. 1987).
106. See id. at 657.
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noted psychological parenthood did not, by itself, justify an
extraordinary circumstance warranting a grant of visitation
or custody to the former partner of the child's biological
mother. 07 Moreover, the court maintained a narrow view of
those eligible to receive custody, and noted all claims by
non-legal parents would be insufficient when the right of
the natural parent to full custody of the child remains
undisputed.' The court also expressed boundaries given to
a psychological parent, stating "extraordinary
circumstances" justifying the removal of a child from his
legal parent occur only when the legal parent surrenders,
neglects or abandons the child, is determined to be unfit, or
when an "unfortunate or involuntary extended disruption of
custody, or other equivalent but rare extraordinary
circumstance [occurs] which would drastically affect the
welfare of the child."'09
Today, New York still refuses to recognize the role of
the psychological parent when determining child custody.
In its most recent published opinions,"0 the New York Court
of Appeals determined a non-legal parent of a same-sex
couple may not sue for custody or visitation absent the
presence of a second parent adoption. New York, however,
will apply the rules of comity and recognize all parentage
created by civil unions outside the state without taking into
consideration if a psychological relationship has been
created between the child and the non-legal parent."'
Despite arguments from the non-legal parent that an
implied oral contract existed between her and the child's
biological mother to undertake shared responsibilities in
raising the child the couple created through artificial
insemination, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
in T.F. v. B.L."2 determined although an implied agreement
existed between a homosexual couple to "create a child""'
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. Id. (quoting Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 549 (1976)).
110. See Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010).
111. Arthur S. Leonard, New York Court of Appeals Rules in Lesbian Custody
and Child Support Disputes, LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTEs 79 (June 2010),
http://www.nyls.edu/userfiles/1/3/430/59/ 65/66/In1006.pdf.
112. T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1254 (Mass. 2004).
113. Id. at 1246.
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prior to that child's conception, "parenthood by contract"
was not the law of Massachusetts,1 14 and as such any
agreement between a legal and non-legal parent to raise a
child would be "unenforceable as against public policy." In
denying T.F. status as the child's de-facto or psychological
parent, the court took into consideration the fact she had
not maintained a long-term relationship with the child since
the couple had separated prior to the child's birth, and that
the child had never resided with T.F."' The court also
acknowledged T.F.'s name did not appear on the birth
certificate, T.F. had not legally adopted the child, and T.F.
only made one financial contribution towards the child after
his birth.'16
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in In re Custody of
H.S.H.-K,"7 in the context of custody and visitation rights,
evaluated a ten-year relationship between a lesbian couple
that, after exchanging vows in a commitment ceremony,
determined they wanted to have a child via artificial
insemination."' Although the partner was present during
the child's birth and provided the primary financial support
for the family during the child's life," 9 the court determined
she would be unable to bring forth an action to obtain
custody or visitation rights of the child once the parties had
separated. In making its decision, the court stated a person
who had not been legally related to the child could not
retain standing absent compelling circumstances.120
Compelling circumstances did not include the fact that the
parties were both homosexuals, or mutually agreed to co-
parent a child. 2'
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1247-48, 1253.
116. Id. at 1248.
117. Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.), 533 N.W.2d 419, 421
(Wis. 1995).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 421-22, 437.
120. Id. at 423
121. See id. at 424. Note also that the court remanded the case to the trial
court to determine if the non-legal parent has met the requirements of the four-
prong test.
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That same year, in Music v. Rachford, the Florida
District Court of Appeals refused to acknowledge a former
same-sex partner as a de facto parent, despite her
participation in prenatal classes, her presence during the
child's birth, and the child's use of her surname.' 2 The
Court further stated that a homosexual non-legal parent
could not achieve standing on par with that of the child's
biological mother, even if deemed a de facto parent.'23
Four years later, the Florida Court of Appeals in
Kazmierazak v. Query 24 determined the child's legal parent
retained a superior right to that of the non-legal parent.
Due to this inferiority, the court held psychological parents
would be unable to achieve standing in custody disputes
against the child's biological or adoptive parent. " In
rendering its pronouncement, the court declared it was
beyond the power of the judiciary to interfere with the right
of a child's legal parent to control the upbringing of his or
her child absent a showing of "demonstrable harm to the
child." 26  The court further noted the concept of in loco
parentis is only applicable to those in legally recognized
marriages.127 Thus, since homosexual marriage is not
recognized within the state of Florida, even if a homosexual
co-parent is able to demonstrate status as a child's
psychological parent, he or she would be unable to seek
protection under Florida law.
One year later, the Utah Supreme Court examined
whether a law should be established to grant standing to
former domestic partners of fit legal parents.128 In
responding in the negative, the court placed significant
weight on the authority of the child's legal parent, noting,
"in carving out a permanent role in the child's life for a
surrogate parent, the court would necessarily subtract from
the legal parent's right to direct the upbringing of [the]
122. Music v. Rachford, 654 So.2d 1234, 1234-35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
123. Id. at 1235.
124. See Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So.2d 106, 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
125. See id. at 109.
126. Id. at 107.
127. Id. at 110 (citing to Albert v. Albert, 415 So.2d 818, 820 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982); Taylor v. Taylor, 279 So.2d 364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
128. See Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, 154 P.3d 808.
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child."l29 The court also stated the term "psychological
parent" raises concerns among the judiciary in the sense
that legal parents may be deprived of their innate and legal
custodial rights on the basis of "elusive factual
determinations.""o In arriving at its opinion, the court
emphasized the importance of common law precedent,
highlighting that a court may not make a best interests of
the child inquiry of the non-legal parent "absent a
determination that the legal parent [is] unfit."'31
Holding former same-sex partners were not considered
parents in the eyes of the state legislature, the Tennessee
Appellate Court in In re Thompson'3 2 determined that
despite the psychological attachment forged between the
child and the non-legal parent, the term "parent" must be
narrowly construed when the interest of a child is at stake.
As such, "parent" encompassed only those who maintained a
"biological, legal, for] adoptive" relationship with the
child. 3
In rejecting the doctrine of the psychological parent on
the basis it would expose parents to "a potentially wide
range of third parties claiming a parent-like relationship
with their child,"l3 the Vermont Supreme Court in
Titchenal v. Dexter' denied a non-legal parent standing to
seek visitation rights of the child she helped raise, and her
former partner adopted. Although the court acknowledged
the disintegration of the nuclear family and the public-
policy considerations which favor allowing third parties to
seek court-compelled child contact under the doctrine of the
psychological parent, it determined these considerations
were not compelling enough to require it to "acknowledge
that de facto parents have a legally cognizable right to
parent-child contact""' and instead insisted the
129. Id. at 816.
130. Id. (citation omitted).
131. Id. at 818 (citing to In re Adoption of P.N., 2006 UT 64, 148 P.3d 927,
929); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1368-69 (Utah 1982)).
132. In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 918-19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
133. Id. at 918.
134. Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 688-90 (Vt. 1997).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 689.
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"[l]egislature [would be] better equipped to deal with the
problem."'37 According to the court, when homosexual co-
parents choose to not partake in a second-parent adoption of
the child they intend to raise together, the non-legal parent
forefits any subsequent right to seek custody or visitation
should dissolution of the couple's relationship occur, since
an "adequate remedy at law" existed, and the couple chose
to not take advantage of it.'38
The Illinois Appellate Court in In re the Matter of
Visitation with C.B.L.'39 denied the petition for visitation by
a woman who jointly with her ex-partner planned for and
raised the couple's one and a half year old child. A.B.,
C.B.L.'s non-legal parent, sought visitation with C.B.L.
pursuant to section 607 of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act'40 and on the basis that she was
C.B.L.'s de facto parent, after the dissolution of her
relationship with H.L. Prior to C.B.L.'s birth, A.B. and H.L.
had been in a committed eight-year relationship and equally
agreed to raise a child H.L. would conceive through
artificial insemination. 4 ' In rejecting A.B.'s claim of
psychological parentage, the court reasoned a statute which
concerns an area formerly covered by common law, such as
section 607 of the Marriage Act "should be construed as
adopting the common law unless there is clear and specific
language showing a change in the common law was
intended by the legislature."'4 2 As the Illinois legislature
had yet to indicate or submit demonstrable proof that
homosexual non-legal parents should be encompassed
within section 607, it can be inferred the court determined
psychological parentage could not be awarded to the non-
legal parent, regardless of any attachment between that
adult and child on this basis.14
137. Id.
138. See id. at 686-87.
139. In re Visitation with C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316, 320-21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
140. Id. at 317-18.
141. Id. at 317.
142. Id. at 318 (citing to Proud v. W.S. Bills & Sons, Inc., 255 N.E.2d 64 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1970)).
143. In re Visitation with C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d at 318-21.
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More recently, on June 3, 2008, the Court of Appeals in
Richmond, Virginia revisited the concept of the
psychological parent in Stadter v. Spierko.'" Arguing she
was a "person of legitimate interest" pursuant to Virginia
code §20-124.1, Stadter submitted she should receive either
joint custody or visitation rights to the four year-old child
she and her former partner planned and raised together
since the child's 2003 birth.'45 Throughout Spierko's
artificially inseminated pregnancy, Stadter assisted in
parental expenses and responsibilities and was present for
the child's birth.'46 Stadter and Spierko both gave the child
a hyphenated form of their last names and equally shared
child-parenting responsibilities; Spierko was the primary
care provider, while Stadter provided the child with
substantial financial support.'47 Although expert and lay
testimony demonstrated a forged attachment between the
child and Stadter and that the child would benefit from
continuing interaction'48 with Stadter, visitation and joint
custody was denied on the basis that Stadter failed to
present evidence demonstrating the child would be harmed
if visits with Stadter'49 were discontinued. In upholding the
denial for Stadter's petition for visitation rights, the
Virginia Court of Appeals recognized, "the right of parents
in raising their child is a fundamental right protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment,""' and there was "no reason for
the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family"
unit when a court determined that the child's legal-parent
was fit."' Further, visitation would only be awarded to a
non-legal parent "in contravention of a fit parent's
expressed wishes only when justified by a compelling state
interest,"'52 such as demonstrative evidence the child would
suffer actual harm if visitation rights would be denied.
144. Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 494, 498 (Va. Ct. App. 2008).
145. Id. at 496.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 497.
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting Williams v. Williams, 485 S.E.2d 651, 654 (Va. Ct. App.
1997)).
151. Id. (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000)).
152. Id. at 497-98.
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Again, since Stadter could not provide 'sufficient evidence'
for the court to conclude the child would suffer actual harm
from a lack of visitation by the child's psychological parent,
her claim and the psychological parent doctrine were both
denied.
IV. COURTS SHOULD AUTOMATICALLY EXTEND APPLICATION OF
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENT DOCTRINE TO HOMOSEXUAL CO-
PARENTS UNDER THE TERM "OTHER RECOGNIZED GROUNDS"
AND APPLY THE CLARK TEST TO DETERMINE "PSYCHOLOGICAL
PARENTAGE" AMONGST GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS
A. The Relationship Between a Homosexual Non-Legal
Parent and a Child is an Exceptional Circumstance
Warranting Additional Judicial Protection
The bond forged between a child and his or her
homosexual parent is unlike any relationship recognized
within our judicial system. It is unique, in the sense that it
fails to conform to the traditional family norms of society'54
and leaves bystanders and critics struggling to define its
components. In grasping to comprehend this complex
relationship, courts and legislatures have subconsciously
penalized homosexual parents by prohibiting them from
asserting custodial rights of their child, despite any
psychological or emotional ties that may have been created.
In doing so, courts maximize the detriment a child suffers
solely on the basis that he resides in a family that fails to
comply with traditional standards."5 These standards look
not to the best interest of the child, but to the best interest
of society, and rely on political, social and moral agendas to
punish the child based on the sexuality of his parents. A
child, like any other citizen, "has rights too, some of which
are of a constitutional magnitude." 6 It goes against the
153. Id. at 498-501.
154. See In re T.L., No. 953-2340, 1996 WL 393521, at *2 (Mo. Cir. Ct. May 7,
1996) ("Courts must.. .resolve custody.. .disputes in a way that minimizes the
detriment a child suffers when his emotional bonds do not conform to traditional
family norms.").
155. See id.
156. In re Guardianship of Victoria R., 201 P.3d 169, 174 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008)
(citing Clifford K v. Paul S. 619 S.E.2d 138, 159 (W. Va. 2005)); see also In re
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best interests of that child to restrict "continued association
with those individuals to whom the child has formed an
attachment,"'57 regardless of that party's sexuality.
The determination of what is included as an
"exceptional case" for purposes of child custody disputes is
"too important to be subjected to a mechanical application of
an artificial litmus test containing three factors or two
prongs."' In construing same-sex child custody cases as
"exceptional case[s]" under the doctrine of the psychological
parent, state courts would not be forced to recognize
homosexual relationships, but instead, would be prevented
from asserting decisions that remain contrary to the best
interest of the child. Recognizing same-sex child custody
cases as exceptional cases is not inconsistent with state
court precedent granting homosexual parents standing as a
child's legal parent,' nor is determining that a party may
be deemed a child's psychological parent regardless of that
party's sexuality.'60 Because there is no uniform definition
of the term "family,"'61 courts must adopt a more malleable
approach in defining who may be considered a "parent"
when the safety and happiness of children are at stake.'62
"Treating same-sex couples different [ [from heterosexual
couples] not only [ ] harms those individual] [couples], but
also stigmatizes them and their children by deeming them
unworthy to enjoy fundamental and equal citizenship
Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 669 (Mich. 1993) (citing Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356
N.E.2d 277, 281 (N.Y. 1976)); Johnita M.D. v. David D.D., 740 N.Y.S.2d 811,
813-14 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (citing Bennett, 356 N.E.2d at 281); Boisvert v.
Harrington, 796 A.2d 1102, 1108 (Vt. 2002) (citing Bennett, 356 N.E.2d at 281).
157. Snyder v. Scheerer, 436 S.E.2d 299, 307 (W.Va. 1993).
158. In re Marriage of Williams, 90 P.3d 365, 370 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).
159. See id. at 370. See also V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 550 (N.J. 2000);
Clifford K. v. Paul S., 619 S.E.2d 138, 152-54 (W. Va. 2005) (labeling a dispute
concerning a child who has resided in a household of same-sex parents an
exceptional circumstance requiring custodial determination to be based on the
"best interests of the child" standard).
160. See In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 551 (Colo. App. 2004).
161. See In re T.L., No. 953-2340, 1996 WL 393521 at *2 (Mo. Cir. Ct. May 7,
1996) (citations omitted).
162. Id.
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rights."'63 More important, courts should not retain the
discretion to determine "mere blood relations.. .trump a
relationship based upon love and trust."'" In implementing
this policy, homosexual parents would no longer be forced to
adopt their children in order to attain protection from the
legal system should dissolution of the co-parenting
relationship ensue. Further, parties found to be
psychological parents would receive automatic standing to
contest matters of child custody, and would no longer risk
being deemed subordinate'65 to the legal parent. This notion
would be applicable to all parties who have been deemed
psychological parents by a court of law.
By labeling the homosexual co-parent relationship an
exceptional circumstance and automatically awarding
standing to homosexual co-parents under the psychological
parent doctrine, courts will also eliminate the opportunity a
homosexual legal parent has for forum-shopping. As the
laws on gay marriage and child custody are not uniform
across the nation, estranged legal-parents may manipulate
the judicial system and bring their claim for child custody in
a state that historically has proven to be more politically
conservative or sympathetic towards the treatment of gay
couples in hopes of receiving the decision they desire. In
permitting these legal parents to do so, courts allow them to
reap the benefits of both sides of the coin; when in a loving
homosexual relationship, that party is allowed to find a
more liberal state and insist the relationship between the
child and non-legal parent is recognized, yet when
dissolution of the couple's relationship occurs, that same
legal-parent may maneuver the claim into a state that
refuses to acknowledge the role of the psychological parent
as applied to homosexual co-parents, and thus intentionally
destroy the very relationship he or she worked to create,
without any thought or concern as to how this negatively
impacts the child in question. These individuals "abandon
their parental responsibility of putting their children's
needs before their own selfish desires to punish a former
163. Richard J. Podell, A.B.A. Section of Individual Rights & Responsibilities:
Recommendation, 111 A.B.A. SEC. INDIV. RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITIES 4 (2010)
(citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576, 578 (2003)).
164. Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d at 163 (Starcher, J., concurring).
165. See Dehar v. Dehar, 521 N.Y.S.2d 335, 336 (App. Div. 1987); Cox v. Cox,
2000 ND 144, 613 N.W.2d 516, 521-22.
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partner at any cost, and in the process are willing to
sacrifice vital legal protections for untold numbers of other
children with gay or lesbian and/or un-married parents."66
In identifying homosexual co-parents as exceptional
circumstances, courts will also be able to treat each child in
a similar manner regardless of whether his parents had
entered into a marriage or civil union, or were unable to do
so under the laws of the state where they reside. The
distinction between whether an individual should be
deemed a parent in the eyes of the law should not be based
on whether a "couple in a civil union or not in a civil
union... From the child's point of view, he or she has two
parents."l67 In stripping a child from his or her
psychological parent based on the legal status of the
parent's relationship, courts are punishing a child for
something out of his or her control and putting social and
political agendas before what truly lies in the child's best
interest.
B. The Four-Pronged In re Custody of H.S.H.-K. Test Must
Be Applied to Define "Psychological Parent" so Over
Inclusiveness Does Not Occur
Critics are reluctant to grant homosexual non-legal
parents automatic standing as psychological parents on the
ground that this will provide an outlet for any individual to
relinquish custody from fit legal parents, regardless of that
individual's ties to the child."' As such, they contest
nannies, godparents, neighbors, or distant relatives would
be able to obtain custodial rights under the "psychological
parent doctrine" so long as they attained a close
psychological connection with the child.' To eliminate this
fear, I encourage courts to apply the four-factor test set
forth in In re Custody of H.S.H. -K to determine who may be
166. Gay v. Gay Custody Battles, LAMBDA LEGAL, www.lambalegal.org/news/of-
counselloc_200909-camilla-feature.html.
167. Peters, supra note 17, at A26 (quoting American University Professor
Nancy Polikoff).
168. See Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, 154 P.3d 808, 816.
169. Id. (citing State ex rel J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 715 n.5 (Utah 1990)).
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considered a psychological parent.' Since its inception,
this test has been the primary method used by state and
federal courts to determine the application of the
psychological parent doctrine to homosexual co-parents."'
In incorporating this test into its analysis, courts will
ensure the protection granted to non-biological parents
remains strictly limited in nature.'72 The first element of
this test requires the child's legal parent to consent to and
foster the relationship between the child and the non-legal
parent."' This element behaves in an estoppel manner, and
prevents the legal parent from eliminating the relationship
"which she voluntarily created and actively fostered simply
because after the party's [sic] separation she regretted
having done so."' It also serves as concrete evidence of the
legal parent's distribution of parental authority and
autonomy to the non-legal parent"' and demonstrates
intent to transform sole custodial responsibilities into joint
custodial responsibilities. The three additional
requirements: that the non-legal parent and child co-
habited as a single family unit; that the non-biological
parent assumed parental obligations by taking on
significant responsibility for the care, education, and
development of the child, and that a bonded, dependent
relationship existed between the non-legal parent and the
child, combat the concern that unreasonable intrusions will
be made into the legal parent's custodial rights by nannies,
babysitters and close family friends.'
Further, a non-legal parent may be able to establish
deprivation of a legally recognized right to maintain a
relationship with the child absent showing of parental
unfitness on behalf of the child's legal parent."' Although
170. Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.), 533 N.W.2d 419, 421
(Wis. 1995).
171. In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 550 (Colo. App. 2004); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748
A.2d 539, 550-53 (N.J. 2000); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974 (R.I. 2000).
172. In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 560.
173. Id.
174. Id. (quoting J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)).
175. See V.C., 748 A.2d at 552.
176. In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 560.
177. See Liston v. Pyles, No. 97APF01-137, 1997 WL 467327, at *8 (Ohio Ct.
App. Aug. 12, 1997).
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"the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children," a parent's right to control his child is not
absolute'79 and a legislative enactment may be viewed as
permissible so long as it is "necessary to promote a
compelling state interest and does so in the least restrictive
manner possible."'
Labeling the psychological parent child relationship as
an exceptional circumstance recognizes the state's
compelling interest in protecting the wellbeing and
happiness of the children that reside within it, while
allowing gay and lesbian parents to receive the rights
guaranteed to them under the Fourteenth Amendment.''
The state's interest extends well beyond the roles of the
legal and non-legal parent, and requires the judicial system
to protect this relationship despite the desires of the legal
parent, so the best interests of the child may be advanced. 82
Moreover, courts are unable to justify how it would be
in the child's best interest to be removed from two
supporting, nurturing and loving parents, and instead
placed solely in the custody of one supporting, nurturing
and loving parent who is at odds with a party who has
welcomed, acknowledged, loved and supported that child
since adoption or birth. In unilaterally ripping a child from
his or her psychological parent after he or she voluntarily
created that attachment, the legal parent has failed to act
in the best interest of his or her child and should not be
permitted to receive sole custody or singlehandedly control
the child's upbringing absent the consent and support of the
child's psychological parent.
178. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
179. V.C., 748 A.2d at 548.
180. In re Custody of C.M., 74 P.3d 342, 344 (Colo. App. 2004).
181. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding gay and lesbians are
not excluded from the guarantee of equal protection of the law). See also
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
182. See V.C., 748 A.2d at 552.
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C. The Legal Parent's Waiver of Familial Privacy Cannot
Be Undone
Although critics urge awarding custody or visitation to a
non-legal parent violates the legal parent's right to familial
privacy and the right to maintain exclusive control over the
child's upbringing, this argument has no merit. When a
legal parent encourages or creates a relationship between a
non-legal parent and the child, courts must find that the
legal parent has waived his or her right to subsequently
object to the relationship he or she worked so hard to create.
The legal parent and should not later be permitted to show
that elimination of the forged relationship would not be
detrimental to the wellbeing and mental stability of the
child in question.
CONCLUSION
The bond between a parent and a child is not the
product of gender, sexual orientation or marital status. It is
one generated from the unconditional love, devotion and
attention shared between a parent and a child, regardless of
that parent's sexual orientation. When this relationship has
been created and encouraged by the child's legal parent, it
would be detrimental to the health and well-being of the
child to permit that parent to unilaterally terminate the
relationship at his or her discretion. Extending the
application of the psychological parent to homosexual co-
parents under the term "other recognized grounds" and
applying the In re Custody of H.S.H.-K test to determine
psychological parentage amongst gay and lesbian parents,
removes the tribunal's focus from the political and moral
views of society, and places it where it needs to be: on the
best interest of the child.
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